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The alarm nobody could switch off

The alarm nobody could switch off

Case study · Specialty chemicals, Teesside

A high-pressure trip on Reactor 3 fired intermittently for eleven months. Two engineers had tried to trace it and stopped. The cause was a pressure transmitter decommissioned two years earlier and never removed from the control logic.

The problem

An alarm nobody trusted

Reactor 3 had been raising a high-pressure alarm since the spring of the previous year. It fired perhaps twice a week, never in a pattern anyone could pin down, and never when the pressure on the adjacent transmitter was near the trip point.

By the time Ferry arrived the alarm had been through two investigations. Both ended the same way: the instrument checked out, the loop tested clean, and the trip kept firing. The shift team had stopped treating it as information.

What made it expensive was not the alarm itself. It was that Reactor 3 had, over eleven months, trained its operators to discount one of its own safety signals. Every time the trip fired and nothing was wrong, the cost of ignoring it went down slightly.

The site knew this. It appears in two shift reports and in the minutes of a process safety meeting. Nobody had the hours to take the loop apart while the unit was running, and the next turnaround was eighteen months out.

40 minutes

Time to root cause. Mainframe read the control system code, the alarm history and the SOPs together.

900

Alarms per shift on Reactor 3. Operators had learned to acknowledge the condition without ever reading it.

11 days

Spent across the two investigations. Both were closed without a finding when the work outgrew the time available.

The decommissioned transmitter is the highlighted component.

Fig. 1

What we did

Reading the logic, not the documentation

Ferry connected to the historian and to the control system, and built one workflow against one question: what conditions are actually present when this trip fires.

The workflow read four years of tag history alongside the control logic itself. The documentation described a loop with one transmitter. The logic still referenced two. The second had been removed during a 2024 turnaround and its tag was never deleted.

Nothing was taken offline for any of this. The workflow read from systems that were already recording, over a path agreed with the control system owner before anything was connected. No operator was asked to change how they worked while it ran.

The first credible answer arrived inside a day. The remaining three were spent checking it: confirming the removal against the turnaround records, replaying eleven months of firings against the floating signal, and putting it in a form the safety case would accept.

What the workflow read

Three sources, one question

Tag history

Four years of process data from the historian, sampled at the rate the plant actually records rather than the rate the trend screen displays. Enough to see whether the conditions the trip claims to detect were ever present.

Control logic

The logic as configured on the system, not as described in the documentation. This is where the case turned: the documentation described one transmitter on the loop, the logic still referenced two.

Change records

Turnaround and management of change records from the last five years, which placed the removal of the second transmitter in 2024 and showed its tag was never retired with it.

“We knew it was wrong. Proving it, in a way the safety case would accept, was the problem. Four days of somebody else's reasoning did what two of our own investigations could not.”

↳ Site process engineering lead, specialty chemicals site, Teesside

The results

And what it led to

The tag was removed from the trip logic under the site’s management of change process. The alarm has not fired since. The same reasoning was then pointed at the rest of the unit: three hundred and forty alarms had accumulated since commissioning, and that review is now a standing job rather than a project that stalls.

There is a second result that matters more to the site than the first. The review that came out of this is not a project with an end date. It runs against the logic as it stands, so when the plant changes the reasoning runs again rather than expiring.

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Read the report before you decide

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